This is a review of The Enigma of Reason, A new theory of human understanding by Hugo Mercier and Dan SperberReason is the super-power of humans when compared to the cognitive powers of other animals. If so, why does reasoning lead to such divergent conclusions? What's so super about a faulty power? Reason falls short of being impartial, objective and logical. That's the enigma of reason.
The authors write it is "hard to explain why people who reason from the same premises commonly arrive at divergent or even contradictory conclusions... When people reason on moral, social, political or philosophical questions they rarely if ever come to universal agreement." This is true, but my Bubbles article gives an answer to this puzzling aspect of reason.
The thesis of the book is that the primary function of reason is in social interactions. That it evolved to allow humans to argue and justify themselves. They oppose this to the traditional view, that reason is an invaluable tool for making decisions and for guiding our actions. They state that reasoning is not primarily used for individual problem-solving or truth-seeking. Instead, they argue that reason evolved primarily for social purposes, ie communication, argumentation, and large-scale cooperation. No doubt, reason does fulfill these functions, but to say that this is its main purpose is an extreme view.
This is a difficult book to read. In some places it is so technical that I could not fathom what they were saying.
My definition: reasoning is a conscious process used to argue, decide, evaluate, plan and infer, which broadly speaking operates rationally. As such, it differs from intuitive inference, where a conscious conclusion is arrived at through unconscious processes.
By contrast, the book states that "reasoning is not an alternative to intuitive inference; reasoning is a use of intuitive inferences about reasons... What we do... is derive reasons for our intuitions from these intuitions themselves by a further process of intuitive backward inference. We infer what our reasons must have been from the conclusions we intuitively arrived at. We typically construct our reasons as an after-the-fact justification."
In effect, they claim that reasoning is just intuitive inference applied a second time. This amounts to saying that reasoning is intuitive inference. They deny the very existence of reason as a separate faculty. They argue against Kahnemann's dual process theory, as expounded in Thinking Fast and Slow. To them, there is only intuition, the rest is window dressing.
They believe introspection is largely illusory: "Where we are systematically mistaken is in assuming that we have direct introspective knowledge of our mental states and of the processes through which they are produced... even in the case of seemingly conscious choices, our true motives may be unconscious and not even open to introspection... Not some, but all mental processes, affective and cognitive, are now seen as largely or even wholly unconscious... There are good grounds to reject that there is a power or a faculty of introspection that allows us to directly read our own mind." This is sheer nonsense.
"Reasons are primarily for social consumption. We want our reasons to justify us in the eyes of others... The basic trigger of reasoning is a clash of ideas with an inerlocutor." They seem to ignore that we need to use reason on a daily basis to make all our decisions, big or small, eg should I go shopping today or tomorrow? Do I have time to play tennis before meeting Jim? Can I afford to buy a new car?
They claim reasoning drives us to the choice that is easier to justify. That reasoning often fails to correct mistaken intuitions and sometimes makes things worse. The authors make the absurd claim that reasoning performs abysmally at enhancing individual cognition. They base themselves on various experiments that trick people into making wrong choices, while ignoring the simple fact that we make myriad decisions every day that we can easily justify logically.
"The normal conditions for the use of reason are social, and more specifically dialogic. Outside of this environment, there is no guarantee that reasoning acts for the benefits of the reasoner. It might lead to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This does not mean that reasoning is broken; it is simply working in an abnormal environment." They claim it makes sense for the production of arguments to be biased and lazy, as this is OK in a social context, but that we are more demanding and objective in evaluating others' reasons.
"What is problematic is not solitary reasoning per se, but solitary reasoning that remains solitary... We are as good at recognising biases in others as we are bad at acknowledging our own." This is a good point. However, they go wrong when they continue, "It is an undisputed fact that individual reasoning is rarely if ever objective and impartial." What about the analysis of a logical, technical or scientific problem or of its solution?
"The main role that logic plays in reasoning... is as a heuristic tool that clarifies questions and suggests answers." This goes counter to the standard view that the function of logic is to overcome the limitations of heuristic thinking. "The main role of logic in reasoning... may well be a rhetorical one: logic helps simplify and schematise intuitive arguments." In other words, logic has little more than a cosmetic function... Reason... is a mechanism of intuitive inferences about reasons in which logic plays at best a marginal role." So reason is used after the fact and is not rational. This seems simply silly, as it almost completely negates the role of logic and rationality.
However, they do admit that "reason can bring huge intellectual benefits", especially in science. But only through interactions with others. They stress that, "Reasoning is always an output of a mechanism of intuitive inference." But if reasoning is just intuitive inferences about reasons, how could that possibly produce, theories, mathematical proofs, or even allow us to play chess? They believe that science uses reason successfully only in a social context, ie when it is validated by others. This is nonsense.
They state that humans make inferences using a wide variety of specialised mechanisms, rather than a reason faculty. I find this unconvincing.
Conclusion
I'd sum up this book as using reason to debunk reason (except for its use in a social context). Their book is tightly argued, using many examples and psychological experiments. However, I think one could find even more examples and arguments that demonstrate the opposite thesis: that reason, despite all the possible ways it can be misused, is a useful tool for guiding action, understanding the world and making decisions. It takes more than a few cunning psychological experiments to overturn this view, which is solidly grounded in common sense.
"People quite often arrive at their beliefs and decisions with little or no attention to reasons." So does this mean that when we sign up to do a law degree, this has nothing to do with wanting to practise law? "Humans have limited knowledge of the reasons that guide them and are often mistaken about these reasons.... We are mistaken in assuming that all our inferences are guided by reasons in the first place." In other words, reasons are made up after the fact, ie they are merely rationalisations of our intuitions. "Reasons... play a central role in the after-the-fact explanation and justification of our intuitions, not in the process of intuitive inference itself... Humans are rationalization machines."
It is true that we often use reason to manufacture rationalisations, but I think it essential to realise that reason is a tool, not the master. The master is our emotional self. It is emotion that sets reason the task of justifying false beliefs, bad choices and so forth. The authors gleefully cite Thomas Jefferson's egregious misuse of reason to justify slavery. What they omit to say, is the obvious, namely that Jefferson used his intellect to fabricate racist reasons because he was a rich slave owner and wanted to remain one. To be fair, the authors do at one point mention emotion as a factor, but only in passing.
They cite the very existence of confirmation bias as being strong evidence for their view, as they believe such a flaw could not have evolved if the function of reason were to make good decisions. Again, they totally ignore the overriding power of emotions, which is the actual cause of this bias. Besides, why couldn't reason have evolved with flaws? Why would it be "perfect"? Many evolutionary adaptations, in fact probably most, come in some way at a cost. Their main criticism of the standard view of reasoning is that reasoning is biased and lazy. So what?
The authors take delight in listing all the ways in which reason fails its job. That's all very well, but it is much like drawing up a long list of perceptual illusions to conclude that perception itself does not work. The fact is that reason, operating logically, works extremely well in many contexts, such as in mathematics, computing and scientific thought. Not to mention how it solves the myriad small problems of daily life.
Whereas it is true that people can often come up with better solutions when they discuss things in groups, there is also much evidence for the contrary conclusion. The various cults, QAnon and the followers of Trump are strong counter-examples to the authors' claim that when people discuss together they do better than alone.
The authors believe that logic and rationality are of marginal utility in reasoning. This is a big claim, one they are unable to substantiate.
Overall, their basic mistake is in believing that only two actors are involved in making inferences - intuition and reasoning. In fact, they even reduce reasoning to intuition. The third actor, whose presence they almost totally ignore, is the elephant in the room. It is this thing we call emotion. Emotion actually pulls the strings that make reason dance.